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The purpose of this Honors project is to provide insights into the current condition of Kosovo’s 
vetting system, highlight its major drawbacks, and provide recommendations on how to 
overcome them. This paper discloses that the vetting system, despite being recently established, 
remains greatly challenged by political implications and the clannish and/or individual decisions 
to issue or deny security clearances for civil servants, intelligence and police personnel. The 
study emphasizes that an oversight in the development of the vetting process may come 
associated with political and material costs, thus, putting the integrity and objectivity of the 
whole security system in question. This study uses a mixed-method approach that relies on both 
primary and secondary data, namely desk research, literature review, small-scale surveys and 
semi-structured interviews.  
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I. Introduction  
 
i. Statement of the Problem 
 Kosovo, as a post-war country, represents a sensitive case due to its numerous 
complexities in relation to the Security Sector Reform (SSR). The transitional phase of the 
country began in 1999 with the termination of ongoing conflicts, and the period immediately 
after the hostilities was devoted to peace and recovery. Different from the security sectors of 
Western Balkan countries, Kosovo’s security sector has not undergone any reforms, in contrast, 
it has been newly constructed with the help and supervision of the international community1. 
During the UNMIK presence in Kosovo, there were two primary security institutions, namely the 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)2. Whereas, the period after 
the country’s independence in 2008 involves a new security architecture designed according to 
the Ahtisaari proposal. 
 Up to date, among the vital criteria for Kosovo’s path towards the European Union 
Integration is the governance and democratic oversight of the security sector3. The key 
measurement instrument of Kosovo’s progression towards meeting the EU requirements is the 
European Union Annual Progress Report4. This report has continually shown over the years that 
the overall performance of Kosovo’s security sector has been hindered mainly by the 
development of the security clearance system, highlighting the system’s key role in the security 
sector. The report has repeatedly identified the security clearance system in Kosovo among the 
most concerning dimensions. The concerns were furthermore confirmed as the public discourse 
dilemmas vigorously increased, indicating possible misuse of the system for numerous purposes.  
                                                          
1 (CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for 
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOS-
VETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. 
2 Ibid.  
3 EU Commission. “Progress Report on Kosovo” (2018). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-kosovo-report.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019. 
4 Ibid. 
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 In post-conflict countries, Transitional Justice (TJ) measures are perceived to have a large 
impact in state-building and democratization processes5. During the last few years, these 
measures have become a major topic of academic debates across countries, suggesting that they 
cannot be self-sufficient in lack of an environment that supports an inclusive understanding of 
transitional justice. TJ measures do, however, yield successful results in countries where 
government transparency, political accountability, healthy security and economic sectors exist6. 
This scenario remains far from reality in Kosovo as many of these measures are yet to be 
attained. In the security sector, more specifically, vetting, a fundamental procedure in the 
security field, is tied to concepts such as political corruption and clientelism, hampering the 
civilian oversight. The institution that accommodates the vetting authority, the Kosovo 
Intelligence Agency (KIA) is linked with numerous scandals made public by the media, 
increasing furthermore the perception of an inadequate security clearance system.  
 The security clearance can be identified as a somewhat new process in Kosovo as it 
emerged simultaneously with the establishment of the security institutions7. More precisely, the 
final completion of the legal framework on the security sector occurred in parallel with the 2008 
adoption of the Law on Classified Information and Security Clearance regulating the vetting 
system. (KFOS)8. 
 Security Clearance is granted to a person allowing them access to classified documents or 
confidential areas after having undergone a background check through security vetting9. Four 
types of security clearances for national security positions exist, namely Restricted, Confidential, 
Secret, and Top secret (TS)10. Security Vetting can be defined as an evaluation method which 
                                                          
5 (CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for 
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOS-
VETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.  
9 (KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated 
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-Security-
Sector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019. 
10 US Department of State (2019). “All about security clearances”. 
https://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/c10978.htm. Web. 25 Jan. 2019. 
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confirms whether an individual is a possible risk to the state and its public order. In the scenario 
where security clearance is granted to individuals who are considered to poses risk or threat, they 
automatically become dangerous not only to the security sector, but also to Kosovo’s interests. 
Hence, the security vetting system plays a fundamental role in the security sector. Yet, there is 
ample room for misuse of the security vetting procedure either for personal gain or elimination 
of political opponents11. 
 An oversight in the development of the vetting procedure may come associated with 
detrimental costs (both material and political), questioning the objectivity and the integrity of the 
whole security system. Consequently, the possibility that the process may furthermore be 
misused by the officials to fulfill other personal or political preferences (e.g. to bring inadequate 
individuals into the security sector) must not be overseen12. Hence, to ensure an adequate 
procedure, it is of immense importance that the individuals that manage the vetting process are 
professionally qualified officials with high moral integrity. 
 Having pinpointed security vetting as a procedure which requires immediate attention for 
the betterment of the security sector in Kosovo, this project provides a detailed overview on the 
current situation of Kosovo’s vetting system and its major drawbacks by analyzing current and 
past practices that are detrimental to the vetting system, namely, Transitional Justice and 
Security Sector Reform. Furthermore, this document aims to provide helpful insights into the 
context of security clearances, as well as the up to date performance of the vetting procedure in 
the Kosovo’s security sector. Using a mixed-method approach that relies on both primary and 
secondary data, namely desk research, literature review, small-scale surveys and in-depth semi-




                                                          
11 (KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Available at 
http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2019.  
12 Ibid.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
i. Security Sector in Kosovo 
 Kosovo’s security sector is comprised of various institutions and mechanisms. Their 
powers and competencies are set forth in the country’s constitution and supported by regulations 
and laws. The government (Prime minister and other ministries), the President, the Parliament, 
the Kosovo Security Council, Kosovo Police, Kosovo Security Force, and the Kosovo 
Intelligence Agency make up the most important bodies and mechanisms of the country13.  
                                       
 
 
                                  Figure 1.  Organization of the Security Sector14                                                                                        
However, not all of the abovementioned security institutions have the power to use force or 
retain an executive mandate. Currently, among other local security institutions, Kosovo Police is 
the only body that is empowered to use any physical force, thus, being the most important 
                                                          
13 (DCAF) Center for Security, Development, and the Rule of Law (2012). “Almanac on Security Sector Oversight in 
the Western Balkans”. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces. Baka, Bogdanovski, et al. Available at http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/almanac.pdf 
14 Ibid. 
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security institution of the country15. Whereas, the intelligence sector, represented by the Kosovo 
Intelligence Agency, represents the last phase of a country’s security sector reform and 
democratization processes. The rule of law and democratic governance, as demonstrated in many 
established democracies, are known to reach the intelligence sector only after having been well 
established in other areas of one state16. 
                                        
Figure 2. Mapping of the Security Sector in Kosovo
17 
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ii. Context of Security Vetting and its Purpose 
 Vetting is the investigation process of personnel in state institutions, businesses, and any 
other positions which have access to confidential data18. The purpose of vetting is to confirm 
whether an individual is of integrity to execute a sensitive activity. One’s obedience to the laws 
and the state constitution can be measured through the integrity and trustworthiness of the 
individual19. Those who have had a dubious past e.g. engagement in organized crime, terrorist 
activities, or corruption, will not pass the vetting test and therefore, will fail to fulfill the position 
at stake. Positions which require screening of personnel are found in the security institutions (e.g. 
police, military, or intelligence agencies), in the executive branch, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations responsible for dealing with sensitive data20. The vetting system differs across 
states, ranging from a centralized model in which only one chief agency is in charge of 
conducting vetting for all the other institutions, to a decentralized model in which each body has 
its own vetting units where private contractors carry out the vetting process21. Even though the 
techniques used in a vetting process differ from one country’s model to another, common 
procedures include standard forms to be filled which require the input of personal information, 
face to face interviews, electronic checks that reveal financial, criminal, and medical records, and 
reference confirmation22. 
 Despite the critical role vetting plays in ensuring trustworthiness and integrity of an 
individual to conduct important activities and positions, the procedure also serves as a 
transformative tool of the institutional setting in post-war countries23. As such, an adequate 
vetting system would be able to transform the institutions that have failed to develop and 
maintain trust with their citizens in the past. In light of these facts, vetting does not only 
                                                          
18 (CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for 
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOS-
VETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 DCAF 2006a: Vetting and the Security Sector, DCAF Backgrounder 
22 Ibid. 
23 EU Commission. “Progress Report on Kosovo” (2018). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-kosovo-report.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019. 
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contribute towards legitimacy of the public institutions, but it does provide larger implications 
for the government reform. However, under the scenario of a flawed vetting system, which is 
often present in post-conflict countries that lack strong policy and legal frameworks, well-
functioning institutions, or economic stability, the vetting procedure will not be able to positively 
contribute to government reform and institutional trust24.Nevertheless, the possibility that the 
vetting system may become a victim of corruption and misconduct must not be excluded. 
 A study conducted by the Center for Research, Documentation and Publication in 
Kosovo shows that there are two main issues when introducing a vetting procedure in post-war 
countries, namely employment restrictions (e.g. lack of qualified staff) and post-vetting 
reintegration25.  Keeping in mind that qualified personnel is very hard to find in post-conflict 
countries, the vetting system must not be introduced immediately but rather gradually to ensure 
that institutions are adequately staffed26. Furthermore, the process must ensure reintegration of 
the staff that has been hired prior to the conflict, even for those who have failed to become part 
of the personnel of the newly established order27.  
 As previously mentioned, vetting involves oversight of security institutions including the 
intelligence agencies28. This process is usually done by the judiciary, the Members of the 
Assembly, or other responsible public units which are to collect data, communicate them with 
the intelligence agency, and together come up with conclusions and recommendations29. 




                                                          
24 (CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for 
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOS-
VETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 US Department of State (2019). “All about security clearances”. 
https://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/c10978.htm. Web. 25 Jan. 2019. 
29 Ibid. 
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iii. Security Vetting in Kosovo 
  Introduced by the international community, the vetting system in Kosovo is based on 
two laws: Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and Security Clearances 
and Law No. 03/L-063 2008 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency30. The purpose of the first law is 
to establish an inclusive system for classifying data related to Kosovo’s security and for the 
security clearances that are issued to individuals who have access to it. The law is composed of 
eight chapters, namely the general provisions, classification of information, personnel security, 
files and data protection, industrial security, administration of the classification and security 
clearance system, and the final provisions. Its articles mainly focus on the purpose and scope of 
security vetting, the classifying information criteria, classification levels, and the process of 
establishing a vetting authority. The law also highlights that classified information must involve 
issues of foreign relations, state security, intelligence activities , or any other information that 
concerns Kosovo’s security interests.  
  Under the Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and Security 
Clearances, information can be classified in four different levels: “top secret”, “secret”, 
“confidential”, and “restricted”31. Top secret information, being the highest level of 
classification, can only be granted to the following actors: “the President of Kosovo, the 
President of the Assembly of Kosovo, the Prime Minister; the Chair of the Kosovo Security 
Council, the Director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, the Director General of the Kosovo 
Police (KP), and the Commander of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF)”.32 Meanwhile, “Secret”, 
“Confidential” and “Restricted” original classification authority may be exercised only by 
                                                          
30 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.  
31 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.  
32 Katy A. Crossley-Frolick & Oya Dursun-Ozkanca (2012). “Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in 
Kosovo: Comparing the Kosovo Security Force and Police Reform Processes, Journal of Intervention and State 
building”, 6:2, 121-143, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2012.655595 
   
 
 
RIT Kosovo (A.U.K) 
Germia Campus Nazim Gafurri, 21 Dr. Shpëtim Robaj, 
 Prishtinë 10000, Republic of Kosovo  
 
kosovo.rit.edu   Page 16 of 61 
 
 
Permanent Secretaries, Chief Executive Officers or Executive Directors of public authorities and 
other equivalent senior positions33. 
 Under Article 24 of this law, the vetting authority belongs to the Kosovo Intelligence Agency 
responsible for issuing security clearance. In order to obtain security clearance, the request must 
be sent by the public institution that seeks the issue for their employees34.  
 To oversee the activities of KIA and ensure a lawful vetting procedure, a special unit has 
been established under the name of Parliamentary Oversight Committee (POC)35. The mandate 
of the POC is highlighted under Chapter VIII of the Law No. 03/L-063 2008 on the Kosovo 
Intelligence Agency, whose main responsibilities include: (i) overseeing the activities of KIA 
and ensuring legality of these processes; (ii) reviewing Prime Minister’s reports regarding the 
issue at stake; (iii) reviewing KIA Director’s reports regarding the expenses and activities 
performed by the intelligence institution; (iv) reviewing reports sent by the Inspector General; 
(v) reviewing KIA’s budget proposal and providing feedback opinion; and (vi) conducting  
investigations regarding the operations, responsibilities, and employee behaviors of the KIA.36 A 
better understanding of the vetting system based on Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the 
Classification of Information and Security Clearances in Kosovo can be provided through the 







                                                          
33 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Kosovo Intelligence Agency. “The Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency” (2010). Available at http://aki-
rks.org/HTML_ENG/2008_03-L063_en.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019. 
37 Ibid, 
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Figure 3. Overview of the vetting system based on Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and 
Security Clearances in Kosovo 
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iv. The Process of Security Clearance in Kosovo 
 Given the fact that the process of security clearance has emerged at the same time with 
the establishment of the security institutions, it can be said that this process is a novel one for 
Kosovo. Indeed, the completion of the legal framework on the security sector happened around 
the same time as the Law on Classified Information and Security Clearance was adopted- the 
Law regulating the vetting system in Kosovo38. Therefore, the law drafting process of the vetting 
system in Kosovo was sponsored by the government and was initiated during 2008 while most of 
the security institutions in Kosovo were newly established e.g. the Kosovo Intelligence Agency 
(KIA), and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The law was drafted by a team composed of 
national and international experts who were engaged in examining models of security clearance 
applied by other countries while striving to match these already introduced practices to Kosovo’s 
context.  
 The main issue that emerged during the process of law-drafting was to determine in 
which of the proposed institutions the central authority for implementation of the law is to be 
positioned. The team of experts came up with the decision that the vetting authority would have 
to be situated at the newly established institution, namely the Kosovo Intelligence Agency 
(KIA), under the assumption that the other already operating security institutions are 
politicized39. The law was proposed in 2010 to the Kosovo Assembly and was adopted during the 
same year. The law highlighted the fact that the Department for Security Clearance- the authority 
in charge of vetting, even though being structurally part of the KIA, would be autonomous from 
the other departments and the Director of KIA40. However, since its establishment in 2010, the 
Department for Security Clearance started misusing its authority41. While being part of the 
structure of KIA, the department soon began acting the same way as the other units of the 
agency, thus becoming completely non- transparent to the public42.  
                                                          
38 (KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Available at 
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 In this respect, in 2013, media reported potential unlawful actions of the Department for 
Security Clearance, where people were granted non-merit-based security clearance certificates 
on the basis of personal or group interest43. These practices raised concerns not only among 
officials but also among public opinion regarding the professionalism of the vetting authority. 
That the Department was facing serious problems became further apparent by the beginning of 
2014, when the Kosovo Police arrested one of the Departments’ senior officers for fraud under 
the suspicion that the individual had allegedly falsified secondary school diploma44. This event 
furthermore contributed towards weakening of the credibility of the vetting system in Kosovo.  
 In order to avoid the occurrence of such cases, the role of the Department for Security 
Vetting within the KIA has been defined exclusively to prevent the security system from any 
personal, political, or administrative influence. As such, the legislators have purposely regulated 
the role of the Department for Security Vetting, giving it the right to act as an administrative unit 
with legal functional autonomy. 45 The head of a public institution is to send a written request 
with a specific classification level (confidential, secret, or top secret) to the head of the 
Department for Security Vetting. The whole idea of the lawmakers was to disengage the Director 
of the KIA from the process entirely, hoping that a minimal involvement of the director would 
minimize any possible outside influence. 
 While the intention of legislators was to separate the activity of the Department for 
Security Vetting from that of KIA, the law specifies that only KIA is the responsible authority 
for conducting security vetting. Hence, indicating that the Department for Security Vetting is 
only one of the other units within the KIA. As such, this department would have to function 
under the Law on the KIA and the other internal KIA regulations. While the aim of the 
lawmakers was to authorize KIA as the main authority for conducting Security vetting, by 
simultaneously giving power to the Department for Security Vetting, the law failed to properly 
function in practice. Due to conceptual ambiguity, the Vetting procedure remains far from 
perfect, thus, it should either be KIA who conducts the security vetting or another institution, 
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independent from KIA. It is not appropriate to ask KIA to be the vetting authority while 
simultaneously asking it not to fulfill these duties. A process as such, not only weakens the 
functioning of the security vetting, but it also further complicates the role of the Department for 
Security Vetting inside the KIA.  
 A person is issued a Security Certificate by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency only after 
having passed the Security Vetting procedure. As the law points out, the person issued a security 
certificate must be perceived an acceptable security risk46. The security clearance will 
automatically be denied if a person is considered an unacceptable risk. An individual that poses 
unacceptable risk is one who: 
 Is disloyal to the Republic of Kosovo, its Constitution and its laws and orders 
 Can easily be influenced, manipulated, or blackmailed to help an individual, a certain 
group, an institution, or a foreign  government whose intentions are to act against the 
security interests of the Republic of Kosovo 
 Perform actions that show signs of mental, personality, or emotional disorder, lack of 
self-control, lack of judgement, lack of will to obey orders, insincerity, and any other 
behaviors that raise suspicion regarding his/her condition, loyalty, and the capability to 
not disclose any classified information47 
After having conducted the Security Vetting Procedure and an individual has proven to be an 
unacceptable risk for the security sector of the Republic of Kosovo, the KIA must continue 
monitoring the individual in general while also evaluating the information about his/her 
behaviors based on the following factors: 
 The nature of the behavior 
 The conditions that follow that specific behavior 
 The latest occurrence of the behavior and its frequency 
                                                          
46 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.  
47 Ibid. 
   
 
 
RIT Kosovo (A.U.K) 
Germia Campus Nazim Gafurri, 21 Dr. Shpëtim Robaj, 
 Prishtinë 10000, Republic of Kosovo  
 
kosovo.rit.edu   Page 21 of 61 
 
 
 The current age and maturity level of the individual during the performance of the 
behavior 
 The extent to which his/her will contributed to such behavior 
 The motive behind the behavior 
 Potential for being used, forced, pressured, or threatened 
 Likelihood for repetition of such behavior 48 
 Having identified the abovementioned criteria, it becomes apparent that the Security 
Vetting procedure is a very complicated and sensitive process. The purpose of the process must 
be to come up with a thorough evaluation of an individual, and the importance of the procedure 
appears fully only when the evaluation deems a person as an unacceptable risk for the Republic 
of Kosovo. Being denied the security clearance or being forced to move out of a current job 
position is not as equally important as the official qualification of a person as a non- acceptable 
risk for the country. A qualification as such is very harsh, and it encompasses moral 
consequences which are beyond worse than just a simple denial of a security clearance 
certificate. In order to qualify a person as disloyal to the Republic of Kosovo, the evaluation 
method must be based on facts and unbiased judgement. If the Security Vetting Procedure proves 
categorizes a person an unacceptable risk, the latter has the right to contest the decision49. Under 
this scenario, to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of privacy of that person, a 
hearing procedure might be carried out. However, under certain cases e.g. when the security or 
political interests of the Republic of Kosovo might be threatened or challenged, the hearing 
procedure might not be held at all.  
 Practically, most of the intelligence agencies use the justification that the hearing 
procedure might be in contradiction with the protection of secret and public interest, hence, 
completely avoiding the hearing procedure. While this justification might sound right, neglecting 
a hearing procedure by the intelligence agency raises questions about the objectivity of this 
decision and the possibility of misuse of the argument. Having highlighted this fact, then the 
                                                          
48 (KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Available at 
http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2019.  
 
   
 
 
RIT Kosovo (A.U.K) 
Germia Campus Nazim Gafurri, 21 Dr. Shpëtim Robaj, 
 Prishtinë 10000, Republic of Kosovo  
 
kosovo.rit.edu   Page 22 of 61 
 
 
judicial protection comes into question, considering that hearing the party is a fundamental 
human right, the judicial must be capable of revising the decision of the agency in charge that 
has denied the right to hearing of an individual. However, the scenario of a weak judicial 
protection indicates potential for misuse of the power by the intelligence agency. In other words, 
weak judicial protection gives executive power to the intelligence agency who may use the 
argument of protecting state secret and public interest to violate the rights of an individual. After 
the Security Vetting Procedure deemed a person as an unacceptable security risk, the person will 
be receiving a written decision that he/she has been denied the security clearance certificate50. If 
the individual wants to appeal this decision, he/she can do so within fifteen (15) days upon 
receipt of the written decision. The appeal used to be submitted to the Inspector General of the 
Kosovo Intelligence Agency, however, the procedure has now changed according to the 
Government Regulation no. 37/ 201251. Following the new procedure, the appeal is now 
addressed to the Director of the KIA, whereas the decision for denying the security clearance of 
an individual is taken by the Security Vetting Department52. The purpose behind this change was 
to avoid any inconveniences since the inspector general of the KIA is not a body of the second 
grade, hereby, not suitable to report to the Prime Minister and the President  of the State. If the 
general was to report, then their rank with the director of the KIA would be the same.53 However, 
even the new regulation still raises dilemmas (both political and judicial) considering the fact 
that the Security Vetting process is not only conducted for the KIA officials but also for other 
significant institutions such as the Kosovo Police, the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, the 
Ministry of Justice, etc54. Regardless of the fact that the officials of the aforementioned 
institutions might be refused by the Inspector General or the Director of the KIA, the refusal 
would still come from the same institution, the KIA. 
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v. Main Challenges of the Security Clearance in Kosovo 
 
  Under the Law on Classified Information and Security Clearance, the Kosovo 
Intelligence Agency is responsible for both vetting for access to sensitive data and the vetting 
conducted for recruiting security employees in other public institutions55. That means that the 
Kosovo Intelligence Agency is mandated to conduct vetting for the other horizontally equal 
security institutions such as the Kosovo Police, or the Armed Forces56. Consequently, the first 
challenge facing the security vetting in Kosovo has to do with the dominant authority of the KIA 
over the other security institutions. The issue has been raised when the Intelligence Agency 
became responsible for conducting vetting for the recruitment level of the other public 
institutions, becoming a far advanced and higher authority institution compared to other security 
units57. Not only does this procedure make KIA a dominant authority towards other security 
institutions, but also towards the Kosovo Assembly.  
 According to the aforementioned law, only the President, the Prime Minister, and the 
Chair of the Assembly have access to all the levels of sensitive information, meaning that, the 
Members of the Parliament of the Kosovo Assembly are not exempted from the vetting 
procedure conducted by the KIA58. In other words, this responsibility makes KIA an executive 
body with authoritative position towards the MPs of the Kosovo Assembly, excluding the 
President of the Assembly. That is, in order to have access to classified information, all the MPs 
of the Kosovo Assembly must be issued security clearance by the KIA. This issue has received 
special attention prior to May 2014 when the KIA provided no security clearance to the MPs of 
the oversight committee who were responsible to specifically oversee the activities and overall 
performance of the KIA. This procedure, where a legislative body requests security clearance by 
an executive body was not initiated at all by the person in charge, the President of the Assembly, 
                                                          
55 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.  
56 (KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated 
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-Security-
Sector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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who did not make the request under the assumption that such a procedure is not logical. Since the 
Kosovo Assembly MPs did not have access to classified information, the overall performance 
and efficiency of the Kosovo Assembly was impacted. A procedure as such which involved 
vetting of the overseers by the KIA, has generated dissatisfaction which then led to conflict of 
interest among the public institutions. 
 Apart from the highlighted challenges facing the security system in Kosovo, another 
particularly concerning issue appears to be the existing appeal system. Under the Law of the 
Kosovo Intelligence Agency Nr.37/2012, individuals who undergo the vetting process and fail to 
pass the security clearance have the right to appeal59. The right to appeal is based on the internal 
regulation of KIA responsible for regulating the complaint procedures of all the individuals who 
complain on the decision of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. The first step is to direct the 
complaint to the Inspector General of KIA, who is responsible for responding within a timeframe 
of 30 days. In case of a failed attempt, where the Inspector General rejects the complaint, the last 
step involves the Basic Court. 
 The members of the Kosovo Police (KP) and the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCP) has 
undergone the process of security vetting by the KIA during the years 2013-2014. Resultantly, a 
large number of these members, including senior officials failed to pass the security clearance 
process. The number of officials that were rejected the security clearance certificate was more 
than 50, all of whom made complaints regarding the vetting process conducted by KIA. The 
current appeal system is faced with two significant challenges: (1) the individuals rejected the 
security clearance certificate are instructed to submit their complaints within the KIA 
(supposedly the complaints should be submitted at another independent authority), and (2) the 
last means to bring the case of security clearance denial to court has become troublesome for the 
judiciary since none of aforementioned cases has followed the existing appeal cycle60. 
                                                          
59 Kosovo Intelligence Agency. “The Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency” (2010). Available at http://aki-
rks.org/HTML_ENG/2008_03-L063_en.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019. 
60 (KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated 
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-Security-
Sector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019 
60 Ibid. 
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vi. Supervision of Legality 
 
 An institution is supervised both legally and politically. At the political level, the KIA is 
supervised by the Parliamentary Committee on the Supervision of the Kosovo Intelligence 
Agency61. However, the mere fact that the Members of the Committee on Supervision of the 
KIA lack the security clearance, has hugely impacted the democratic control and the mandate of 
supervision of the KIA62. The Security Vetting Process has not been initiated for the Members of 
the Parliamentary Committee because the Assembly of Kosovo has never filed a request to the 
KIA for initiating the process. This, for the sole reason that the Committee itself performs under 
the KIA. Several international organizations together with the Assembly of Kosovo has brought 
to light the issue that the executive branch cannot exercise the security vetting authority for the 
legislative branch. Assembly of Kosovo argued that the vetting process of the Members of the 
Parliament will not be unbiased and/or objective. However, the reason why the members of the 
Committee on the Supervision of the KIA still do not have Security Clearance is due to the 
conflict of interest between the KIA that is responsible for conducting the vetting and the MPs 
who would supervise it63.  
 All these inconsistencies diminish the credibility of the vetting process, thus, pointing to 
the idea that the executive branch can indeed influence the legislative branch through the security 
vetting procedure. One way of influencing could be manifested through the denial of security 
clearance, where one would discriminate between the MPs who are “wanted” and those who are 
“unwanted” to have access to classified data64. The vetting procedure of MPs requires the 
executive branch, more specifically the KIA, to create a database consisting of files on MPs, 
their past, their families, their wealth, social ties, etc65. The access to such data furthermore 
leaves room for misusage of the process by the executive branch.  
                                                          
 
61 (KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Robert 
Muharremi. Available at http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan.  
62 Ibid. 
63 DCAF 2006b: Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services, DCAF Backgrounder 
64 KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Robert 
Muharremi. Available at http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan.2019. 
65 DCAF 2006b: Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services, DCAF Backgrounder 
   
 
 
RIT Kosovo (A.U.K) 
Germia Campus Nazim Gafurri, 21 Dr. Shpëtim Robaj, 
 Prishtinë 10000, Republic of Kosovo  
 
kosovo.rit.edu   Page 26 of 61 
 
 
A considerable number of complaints who have not passed the vetting procedure of the 
KIA has been received by the Committee on the Supervision of the Kosovo Intelligence 
Agency66. The cases of the individuals who have failed the vetting process were investigated by 
the officials of KIA and the Committee, cooperatively67. Despite the fact that several MPs were 
not issued security clearances, the KIA granted the members of the MP and the members of the 
Committees on Supervision of KIA access to classified data of the individuals wo have failed to 
pass the vetting procedure68. A large number of appeals mainly coming from the Kosovo Police 
was received by the Committee on the Supervision of the KIA. Most of the individuals who were 
denied the security clearances belonged to the “Confidential” level of classified information69. 
The aforementioned facts draw attention to three significant problems regarding the 
supervision of legality. The first one being that the Parliamentary Committee was engaged in the 
process of reviewing the complaints of individuals who have been denied their security 
clearances when the Committee has no legal authorization whatsoever. In fact, the appeals 
process is regulated by the regulation 37/012 after which procedure the complaining party can 
directly address the issue to court. 
 The second problem concerns the role of the Judicial Branch on the overall procedure of 
the security vetting. Up to date, the security vetting procedure has not been conducted on judges 
yet, a scenario which contradicts with the rule that the judges who deal with appeals against KIA 
are supposed to have passed the whole vetting procedure successfully themselves. The judges 
justify their actions by hiding behind the argument that the Executive branch has no power over 
the judicial branch, that is, KIA does not have authority to conduct the vetting of the judges. 
Nevertheless, a rule as such has never been stated anywhere in the Law on the Classification of 
Information and Security Vetting, factually, paragraph No.2 of the Article 22, highlights that 
only the President, the Prime Minister, and the Assembly of Kosovo Speaker are excluded from 
                                                          
66 (KFOS) Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. “Progress on Security Sector Governance: Vetting and Integrated 
Border Management” (2014). Available at http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Progress-on-Security-
Sector-Governance.pdf. Web. 21 Jan. 2019. 
67 (CRDP) Center for Research, Documentation and Publication (2015). “Kosovo’s Security Vetting: A Case for 
Further Reform”, Paulina Nowak. Available at https://crdp-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/KOSOVOS-
VETTING-SYSTEM-CRDP.pdf. Web. 24 Jan. 2019. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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the vetting procedure70. This activity of the judicial branch leaves room for a lot of 
misinterpretation such as the idea that the judges are not given access to sensitive data so that 
they cannot impede the court decisions against the KIA either. In addition, the independency of 
the Judicial Branch under this scenario also denies the right of the aggravated party to have legal 
protection, a case which does not align with the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 
Last, there are problems concerning the implementation of decisions by the KIA, more 
specifically, decisions of the KIA that have not been implemented by the Kosovo Police 
regarding the refusal of security clearances of numerous Kosovo Police Members. That there is 
lack of cooperation between the KIA and the Kosovo Police became furthermore apparent by the 
act that the Kosovo Police did not implement the decision of the KIA without getting approval to 
do so by the final court71. This act of the Kosovo Police puts the objectivity of the KIA 
furthermore in question. 
Having introduced significant processes of the vetting system in Kosovo, this section is 
finalized by briefly presenting the draft law on Protection of Classified Information which was 
drafted especially for the purpose of overcoming the current obstacles facing the system. The 
importance of this draft law will become apparent especially in the results section of this 









                                                          
70 Assembly of Republic of Kosovo. “Law on Classification of Information and Security Clearances” (2010). Available 
at http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2010-178-eng.pdf. Web. 17 Jan. 2019.  
 
71 KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “A Short Policies Document: Security Vetting” (2015). Robert 
Muharremi. Available at http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Security_Vetting_405656.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2019. 
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vii. Draft Law on Protection of Classified Information 
 Pursuant to Article 65 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the Assembly of 
the Republic of Kosovo approved the Law on Protection of Classified Information72.  The 
purpose of this Law is to protect the interests of the Republic of Kosovo by improving the 
system for protection of classified information. In order to establish a unique system which is 
completely free of biases and/or any subjectivity, this draft law establishes a new Intelligence 
Agency, namely the Agency for Protection of Classified Information (APCI), whereby carefully 
highlighting its role, mission, functioning, structure, duties and responsibilities. 
  The agency shall be established as a national security agency which will serve to all the 
public institutions of the Republic of Kosovo and their contractors related. APCI is to be a 
central authority located in Prishtina with a fully professional, politically impartial, non- 
judgmental, and law-abiding personnel. Regarding the transitional and final provisions, 
according to this law, the Verification Department together with the files it has access to, shall be 
relocated to the new agency under the commencement of the procedures by the Director of APCI 
in cooperation with the Director of the existing agency, KIA. Whereas, current personnel of the 
former agency KIA will have the opportunity to voluntarily choose through a declaration 
whether they want to work for the APCI or to remain within the former agency’s structures- 
KIA. As per the assets of the KIA, the law highlights that the Directors of the two agencies, 
namely that of ACPI and of KIA will have to agree with one another so as to use the KIA’s 
assets until the completion of ACPI staff. 
 Finally, upon entry into force of the Law on Protection of Classified Data, any term KIA 
that is used in the context of the Vetting Authority in any provisions of the laws and sub-legal 
acts, shall be replaced with the new term APCI. 
 
 
                                                          
72 Government of Kosovo, Office of the Prime Minister. “Draft Law on Protection of Classified Information” (2018). 
Available at http://konsultimet.rks-gov.net/viewConsult.php?ConsultationID=40477  
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 This investigation is based on the findings and the extensive research conducted in the 
period over one year 2018-2019. Due to its secretive nature, the research on the security and the 
intelligence sector, more specifically, on the security vetting was challenging due to several 
obstacles. Besides the informative documents posted by the KCSS that provided extensive 
research on the topic of security vetting in Kosovo, as well as the CRDP publication that focuses 
mainly on secondary data, the field of vetting in Kosovo remains largely unexplored.  
 Driven by this fact, I found it interesting to challenge myself with the topic of security 
clearances. Even though the research process resulted to be much more challenging than initially 
predicted, this paper aims to bring to light a comprehensive understanding of the vetting system 
in Kosovo. The methodology used to gather information for this project is separated in two main 
categories. The first one is focused extensively on desk research and literature review mainly 
based on publications from KCSS and CRDP. Whereas, the second phase of research explores 
the current vetting practices and personal perceptions of both the insiders of the vetting system 
and the individuals subject to security vetting using small-scale surveys and semi-structured 
interviews. 
a. Secondary Data Collection 
 This phase of the investigation involved the process of researching the existing literature 
and studies on security vetting in Kosovo. Keeping in mind that the vetting system is a very 
sensitive topic to be explored, the information available on the ground was neither sufficient nor 
satisfactory. To achieve the intended results, I mainly focused on two most relevant documents 
“Security Vetting: A short policies document”, and “Kosovo’s Vetting System: A Case for 
Further Reform”, published by the Kosovar Center for the Security Studies and Center for 
Research, Documentation, and Publication, respectively. To get a better view of the vetting 
system and the context of security clearances, I also consulted experts from both local and 
international universities and organizations who have dealt with such practices. The webpage of 
the government of the Republic of Kosovo was a useful source to retrieve information on 
necessary laws and publications- needed for the purpose of this research. 
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b. Primary Data Collection 
Part 1: Semi-structured interviews 
 I have completed an extensive qualitative analysis on the ground by conducting 12 semi-
structured interviews with scholars who have done work on Kosovo’s security sector or are 
members of the public institutions who either conduct security oversight or are subjects of 
classified information.  Due to anonymity principle of conducting research more detailed 
information about the interviewees nor the institutions they represent is not disclosed. The 
process of reaching the individuals at steak was very lengthy and stressful because of their 
unwillingness to disclose relevant information. The interview requests were sent via email to 22 
different individuals and institutions, however, only 5 of them responded and became part of the 
sample. Ten of the interviews were conducted in-person, whereas only two were conducted via 
email. The interviews were scheduled across 2 months due to the difficulties in reaching the 
interviewees. Each interviewee was provided a consent form, while the permission to record the 
interview was obtained only from five of the interviewees.  The interviews were structured so as 
to get insights into various aspects of the security vetting in Kosovo, its challenges and 
opportunities, the Laws in force and the required amendments, the activities of the current 
Intelligence Agency, and the draft law on Protection of Classified Information. 
Part 2: Surveys 
 This research phase consisted of surveys designed to measure the familiarity of the 
respondents with the security vetting system in Kosovo, the laws regulating this activity and the 
agency who conducts the vetting, namely KIA. Security clearance remains a very sensitive topic 
to be discussed especially in a developing country like Kosovo where a considerable portion of 
the population remains unemployed and uneducated, and thus uninformed about such topics. 
With that in mind, the sample could not involve many respondents, in contrast, it was only 
focused towards a certain group of individuals who were in the position to give answer to the 
sample questions; hence, a snowball sampling technique was used. The sample targeted Civil 
Society representatives, government representatives, members of the Parliament, Representatives 
of key security institutions (KP, KSF, and KIA), and independent experts. Considering the fact 
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that the survey was targeted only to a limited number of respondents with specific backgrounds, 
the surveys were distributed both via email and in-person. The sample was distributed across 
different genders, age groups, and backgrounds, however, one thing they share in common is that 
all of them have at least a bachelor’s degree. The sample was purposely targeted to individuals 
with higher level of education so as to generate data regarding their familiarity with the topic, as 
well as their opinions regarding the recommendations and reforms needed to alter the existing 
condition of the vetting system in Kosovo. 
c. Limitations 
 Due to the secretive nature of this paper, the research on security vetting in Kosovo faces 
several obstacles such as unavailability or lack of access to relevant documents, unwillingness of 
members of the public institutions to cooperate and disclose any information for the purpose of 
this research, and inaccuracy of information received by the interviewees. The topic restricted 
targeting larger groups of the population, therefore making the research process even more 
challenging. The unresponsiveness of officials from different institutions (e.g. government, 
security institutions, independent organizations and researchers), as well as their unwillingness to 
participate in this project can also be highlighted as a limitation for gaining the most accurate 
results. However, considering the lack of data on the topic up to date, 12 interview participants 
and 37 survey respondents, all being individually targeted and having relevant knowledge to the 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
1. Secondary Data  
 According to the Kosovo Security Barometer which measures the trust of Kosovo 
citizens towards the country’s main security institutions, namely the Kosovo Police (KP), the 
Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), the KIA has been 
ranked as the least trusted security institution73. Not only is KIA the least trusted institution, but 
the barometer has shown a constant decrease of the citizens trust from one year to another, so, 
while in the year 2017 there was a percentage as high as 37 of people who trusted KIA, it has 
significantly decreased to only 20% citizens who trust KIA in the year 2018, a fact which 
furthermore illustrates citizens’ dissatisfaction with the existing agency74. To this end, I have 
provided a chart which graphically shows the results of the KCSS Barometer. 
 
Figure 4. Citizens’ trust towards KIA (Kosovo Security Barometer: Seventh Edition 
                                                          
73 (KCSS) Kosovo Center for Security Studies. “Kosovo Security Barometer: Seventh Edition” (2018). Available 
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As it could be inferred throughout the literature review of this research paper, the security 
vetting system in Kosovo is highly, if not, solely dependent on the Law on Classified 
Information and Security Clearance and the activities of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. 
Undoubtedly, the law in practice together with the activities of the agency over years have not 
contributed towards the betterment of the security vetting system in any sense. As such, the Law 
on Classified Information and Security Clearance needs to be amended in order for the 
Department of Classified Information to depart from the authority and structure of KIA. 
According to the documents published by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies and the Center 
for Research, Publication and Development, a completely new law or the amendment of the 
current law would bring two significant changes: (1) improve the oversight of the security sector 
and (2) foster the democratic governance. One unquestionable result would be the removal of the 
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2. Primary Data 
 
I. In-depth Interviews 
In order to get a comprehensive view of the most prevalent issues present in the security vetting 
system in Kosovo, I have classified  the findings from the in-depth interviews into four areas, 
namely institutional, procedural, legal, and political flaws: 
Institutional Flaws 
 The majority of the interviewees pointed out the fact that KIA presides over the vetting 
authority of Kosovo. They furthermore criticized this arrangement by stating that KIA is not in 
the position to exercise this authority, thus, jeopardizing the vetting system. The interviewees 
viewed KIA’s ‘secretiveness’ as one of the most concerning issues regarding the security sector. 
While they were aware of the fact that secretiveness if a prerogative of every intelligence agency, 
they claimed that allowing a certain degree of 
accessibility would be crucial for effective 
public oversight. This scenario, however, is 
inexistent in KIA considering the fact that there 
is no accessibility whatsoever. The KIA does not 
have an informative website nor an effective 
complaint mechanism. As such, information 
regarding highly relevant topics to Kosovo’s 
security can only be received from legal 
regulations. Throughout this research process, it 
was also proven that getting hold of the KIA employees is a very difficult task; access was 
possible only through contacts e.g. phone calls or emails which were left unanswered the first 
time. 
 One other important point that was raised by 6 interviewees was that the activities of KIA 
can be closely related with terms of nepotism and clientelism. They shed light to the past 
practices of the agency (e.g. vetting holdouts for political revenge) which were made public by 
“It is easier to reach 
someone in a rocket 
space in NASA rather 
than an employee of the 
Kosovo Intelligence 
Agency”                                                       
-   Interviewee 2 
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the media, discrediting not only the members of the KIA but the whole security vetting 
procedure.  
Legal Flaws 
 As previously disclosed in this paper, under the current law, the vetting regulations pose a 
conflict of interest. In other words, there is a large room for misuse of power when the vetting 
authority is installed in an institution such as KIA that is horizontally equal to the other 
institutions. For instance, an illustrative example of this conflict is the vetting of the members of 
the Parliamentary Oversight Committee on KIA (POC). In order to carry out their duties, MAs 
must be equipped with security clearances, however, in 
reality, it remains at the KIA’s discretion to issue them 
the certificate or not. This scenario, as previously 
highlighted, leads to a subordination of a legislative 
body to an executive body, thus, disentitling the 
executive body of its oversight power. Some of the 
interviewees who have been familiar with the topic 
provided some interesting insights into the matter by 
bringing to fore the case of security clearances of the 
POC, which had to be officially requested by the head 
of the entity. However, the KIA’s superior position made the process undemocratic, thus, making 
the security clearances of members of POC worthless. Resultantly, none of the members of the 
POC has been vetted and therefore none of them was able to access confidential data crucial to 
their oversight job.  
 The same conflict was seen in the case of vetting of 
judges. The KIA is empowered to conduct vetting for 
judges, whose task is to sue any of the KIA members in 
case of misconduct. This fact once more points out to legal 
flaws as KIA is given authority over the judicial branch. 
The interviewees state that the POC has very little if no 
“Security Clearances 
are the foundation 
of a country’s 
Security Sector” 




“It is an unreliable 
system with 
practice of no 
trust”                                                    
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access to relevant information of KIA, thus, the cooperation between the POC and KIA rather 
than being a matter of course regulated by the laws in force, remains solely dependent on 
individual groupings.   
Procedural Flaws    
 Weak enforceability of law that leads to procedural flaws was one of the other findings 
revealed by the interviewees. One of the reasons that the law remains poorly implemented is that 
certain institutions of the country refuse to accept the fact that KIA is responsible for conducting 
the vetting authority, hereby, refusing to accept the agency’s results. Two of the interviewees 
stated “Among the institutions who adhere to the law are the Ministry of Justice and the National 
Security Council”, while the others refuse to do so. Employees that are denied their security 
clearance make use of their right to appeal against a failed vetting process. As introduced in the 
literature review of this document, the appeals should be submitted to the court. However, the 
majority of the appeals remain unprocessed due to the overload of courts with cases. As such, 
many of the individuals who fail the vetting test refuse 
to leave their positions waiting for their appeals to be 
processed by the court. The overload of court 
fundamentally affects the vetting system and puts more 
pressure to the POC since all the complaints become 
directed to them. Considering the fact that members of 
the POC do not have security clearances or insights 
over the criteria used by the KIA, the law does not 
allow the POC to process the appeals. The majority of 
the interviewees support the claim that that the 
appealing system is dysfunctional. Some even stated that it would not be wrong to assume that 
there is no vetting system in Kosovo at all.  
 
 
“It should be stated 
in the law how to 
defend the 
principles of security 
clearance 
procedures”    
   -  Interviewee 4 
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Lack of trust and lack of cooperation between institutions 
in Kosovo creates a hazardous environment in which 
establishing a functional vetting system becomes 
impossible. Even though these problems were present 
before the vetting system was introduced, the current 
security clearance regulations provides potential for 
further distrust.  The distrust comes as a result of the 
power distribution between the vetting authority (KIA) 
and its oversight bodies. Misuse of vetting creates an 
atmosphere where individuals and institutions no longer believe in the integrity of the vetting 
authority nor in the validity of the vetting results. 
One of the interviewees pointed out the fact that 
the consequences of vetting misuse may have 
direct effects on the whole state-building 
process. The past scandals of the KIA, namely 
blackmailing and clientelist practices were 
continually brought up throughout the interview 
process by many of the participants. Even though    
these practices happened in the past, and the 
people affiliated with such scandals have been 
discharged of their positions, the interviewees 
remarked that the consequences and the culture 
of distrust can still be felt.  
 Another point made by the interviewees was that aggravated relationship between the 




vetting system is 
one which is 
depoliticized” 
- Interviewee 7 
“Security clearances 
should not be 
considered as 
imposition but rather 




- Interviewee 11 
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 The findings of the quantitative part of this research project, which takes the form of a 
survey conducted with individuals from different profiles relevant to the topic, provide helpful 
insights into the role of the security vetting system through the respondents’ lenses. The survey 
findings mainly complement the points made in the part of qualitative research and the results of 
the secondary data so as to get a clearer picture of the main challenges that the vetting system in 
Kosovo faces. The findings that emerged from this investigation are broken down an analyzed in 
the section below. 
1. Demographic Analysis of the Results 
 The respondents had to be 18+ years and with prior knowledge to the topic. As illustrated 
in figure 5 the sample was not 
very diverse with regard to age; 
only 2% belonged to 18-24 age 
group, 47% were 25-39 years 
old, 40% were 40-60 years of 
age, and the additional 11% 
were above 61 years.  
Figure 5. Age of respondents 
That the majority would fall between the age of 25-39 and 40-60 was rather expected 
considering the fact that the respondents were selected based on their knowledge to the topic and 
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The level of education of the respondents of the survey is highly important to our analysis 
considering the quality of information required. Since we are dealing with a topic of secretive 
nature, respondents were 
expected to have finished at least 
their undergraduate studies. As 
the graph shows, none of the 
respondents have finished only                           
their primary education, 2% of 
the respondents have finished 
their primary and secondary 
education, 6% of the respondents 
have finished their primary, 
secondary, and undergraduate studies, 87% of the respondents have finished their primary, 
secondary, undergraduate, and graduate studies, whereas only 5% have finished their doctorate 
studies in addition to the others. The largest group of the sample falls within the “graduate 
studies” category, meaning that their information regarding the topic is to be taken in account 
and to serve as a means for bringing in different insights.                                   
                                                                                           
Profession: The professions of the respondents varied showing their different professional 
background, such as: Professor, Researcher, Lecturer of Legal and Political Subjects, Lecturer of 
International Relations subjects, Police Investigative Officer, Strategy and Doctrine Officer, 
Security and Intelligence Analyst, Sector Coordinator for Public Opinion Research, Security 













Primary Education Secondary Education Undergraduate
Graduate Doctorate
Figure 6. Level of Education 
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2. Respondents’ opinion regarding the effectiveness of security vetting in Kosovo 
The outcomes generated from this question generally matched the results presented in the 
literature review of this paper, meaning that the people’s opinion regarding Kosovo’s security 
system effectiveness have not drastically changed over years, in contrast, their concern regarding 
this sector continues to be relatively high. When asked whether they agree with the following 
statement “Kosovo has an effective security vetting system”, only 10% agreed with the statement 
as opposed to 47% and 22% of the respondents who respectively,  “don’t agree” and “strongly 
disagree” with this statement.  
                                                 
Figure 7. Respondents’ 
opinion regarding the 
effectiveness of security 
vetting in Kosovo                                                                                                                                                    
Statistically speaking, 
there is a general 
dissatisfaction of the 
people who are familiar 
with the system. A 
percentage as high as 47 of the people who strongly disagree with the system’s effectiveness in 
Kosovo leaves room for many interpretations. As highlighted earlier throughout this project, lack 
of trust in institutions, lack of cooperation between security entities, and the accumulation of 











DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING 
STATEMENT: "KOSOVO HAS AN 
EFFECTIVE SECURITY VETTING SYSTEM"
Fully agree Agree No opinion Don’t agree I strongly disagree
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1. Respondents’ opinion regarding the role of the intelligent service 
By analyzing the people’s opinion regarding the intelligence services both in the past and 
present, I tried to come up with the relationship that the system and the agency have with one 
another. As the graph below shows, the majority of the respondents believe that the former role 
of intelligent services served the interest of political groups, indicating that the party who 
controlled the intelligent 
service controlled the whole 
vetting system. This result is 
also supported by the material 
presented in the literature 
review section of this project as 
well as the results of the 
interviews presented in the 
primary data section.  
Figure 8. Respondents’ opinion 
regarding the role of the intelligent service.   
While 4% of the respondents did not agree that the former role of the intelligent services served 
the interest of political groups, 12% had no opinion on the matter. In contrast, there was a high 
share of people who agreed and fully agreed to the statement (31% and 53%, respectively), an 
indicator that intelligence services were involved in clientelist practices which have indeed 
hindered the role of the vetting 
system in Kosovo.                                                                                    
The next question focused on 
the role of the KIA in the 
present, aiming to get a better 





THE FORMER ROLE OF THE KOSOVO 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SERVED THE 
INTEREST OF POLITICAL GROUPS 






TODAY, THE SCOPE OF INTELLIGENT 
SERVICE IN KOSOVO IS BASED SOLELY 
ON THE LAW
Fully agree Agree No opinion Don’t agree Strongly disagree
Figure 8.1. Respondents’ opinion 
regarding the role of the intelligent 
service                     
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opinion regarding agency’s adherence to the law. The results gathered from this question 
supported the arguments presented on the secondary data section of this project as both scholars 
and the respondents believe that the activities of the KIA are not solely based on the law. As the 
graph above shows, only 5% of the respondents fully agreed that the scope of the intelligence 
service in Kosovo is based solely on the law, while 9% agreed, 13% did not have an opinion on 
the matter, 46% did not agree, and 27% strongly disagreed. These results serve as an indicator 
that even though the activities of the KIA are regulated by the law, law inconsistencies continue 
to prevail.  
 
                                                                           







Figure 9. Determinants of a successful and trustworthy Intelligence Service 
Having generated information regarding the current vetting system in Kosovo, the role of the 
intelligence agency in the past, and the law inconsistencies seen in the present, I will now 
explore the respondent’s view on what makes a successful and trustworthy Intelligence Service 
in a democratic country. The next question, different from the others, aims to provide some 
helpful recommendations on the topic rather than explain what the current situation of the vetting 
system is. The respondents were asked to choose one or more options that they believe make a 









Strategic Orientation of National Policies
Financial Aspects
Geopolitical Interests
Technical and Technological Equipment
Democratic Control
Intelligence Service Methodology
What makes a successful and a trustworthy Intelligence 
Service in a democratic country?
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in Figure 9, Democratic Control, the Intelligence Service Methodology, and the International 
Cooperation are three most important determinants of a successful intelligence agency according 
to our survey.  
1. Respondents’ opinion regarding security clearances  
This section of the results will explore the familiarity of the respondents with security clearances, 
their experience with such practices, and their opinion regarding KIA’s performance in this 
matter. Considering that this survey targeted individuals with relevant positions and prior 
knowledge to the topic, it is expected that the majority of the respondents would be familiar with 
the term “security 
clearances”. The 
following question 
asked the respondents 
whether they have ever 
requested security 
clearance. The results 
showed that 68% of the 
respondents were in job 
positions that required           
Figure 10. Respondents’ opinion regarding security clearances                                                                                                                                                  
access to classified information of different levels, whereas the remaining 38% have not. The 
number of respondents 
who have requested 
security clearance 
certificates is quite 
important since it leads us 
to the other question of the 
survey. The number of 
respondents who answered 
92%
8%








HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE 
VETTING PROCEDURE CONDUCTED BY 
THE KIA?
Very satisfied Satisfied OK Not satisfied Very dissatisfied
Figure 11. 
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yes to this question were quite satisfactory since the survey tried to reveal more information of 
the process of security clearances. The following question asked those respondents who                                                                                                                                                           
have requested access to classified information whether they have been issued or denied their 
certificates. The results of these questions showed that 76% of the participants were issued the 
security clearances certificate while the remaining 24% were not. Lastly, the respondents were 
asked about their satisfaction regarding the vetting procedure conducted by the KIA. While 8% 
answered to be very satisfied with the vetting process conducted by the KIA, 11% were satisfied, 
21% were OK, 32% were dissatisfied, and the remaining 28% were very dissatisfied. These 
results suggest that regardless of the fact that the majority of the respondents, specifically 76% 
were issued their security clearance certificates, their satisfaction regarding the vetting procedure 
remained relatively low. The results revealed from the small-scale survey generally matched the 
scholars’ view on the topic who have highlighted that the vetting procedure of KIA is very 
untrustworthy and biased, hence, unsatisfactory.  
2. Respondents’ opinion regarding the Draft Law on Protection of the classified information 
and the Agency for Protection of Classified Information (APCI) 
This section analyzes respondents’ opinion on the draft law on protection of the classified 
information and the new intelligence agency that is to be established under this law. As 
previously disclosed in the literature review section of this project, the purpose of this draft law     
is to protect the interests of the 
Republic of Kosovo by 
establishing a well-functioning 
agency which will resultantly 
bring a free-biased vetting 
system. To explore whether the 
respondents shared the same 
opinion regarding the benefits 
that this draft law will bring, I 





ARE YOU AWARE OF THE DRAFT LAW 
ON PROTECTION OF THE CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION?
Yes No I have heard of it but I am not familiar
Figure 12.  
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The first question, as illustrated in figure 12, asked the respondents how the establishment of the 
agency for protection of classifies information (APCI) would affect the security vetting system 











The results of the second question, as illustrated in the graph above, showed that respondents are 
quite reluctant regarding any improvements this agency could bring. While 39% believed that 
establishing APCI would positively affect the security vetting system in Kosovo, 6% believed 
the opposite, 31% believed that no changes to the current condition would be brought, whereas 
the remaining 24% did not want to share their opinions on this matter. The percentage of 
respondents who believed that the agency would not affect the existing security vetting system, 
more specifically, 31, is quite worrying in the sense that people have lost faith in transparency 
and effectiveness of intelligence services in Kosovo mainly due to past clientelist practices of the 







THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AGENCY FOR 
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (APCI):
Will positively affect the security vetting system Will not affect the existing security vetting system
Will negatively affect the security vetting system I have no opinion on this matter
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V. Summary of Findings 
Having introduced the results generated from the conducted interviews and surveys, this 
section pinpoint some of the most important findings that help us summarize the challenges of 
the security vetting system in Kosovo. The reasons why there are inadequacies in vetting are tied 
to bigger concepts such as weak law enforcement, corruption, weak cooperation between 
security institutions, and general misconceptions about the role and function of security 
clearances. The following are primary source findings which support the data presented in the 
literature review section of this project.  
 The findings suggest that the current vetting system is characterized with poor law 
implementation, dysfunctional appealing system, and weak oversight. 
 
 All interviewees and respondents agree that there is an immediate need to reform the current 
vetting system.  
 The majority of the interviewees and survey respondents’ believe that a legal reform would 
contribute towards an effective and transparent vetting system. 
 Many of our interviewees and survey respondents’ indicated a need for legal reform that 
would lead towards a more regulated and trustful vetting system. 
 Findings shed light to the idea that the law on security clearances remains dysfunctional 
mainly due to the reason that the law was based on models that operate in other contexts 
dissimilar to that of Kosovo. 
 The majority of the interviewees agreed with the claim that effective security vetting has 
many positive aspects on the state-building process.  
 The majority of the interviewees believe that an efficient vetting system can largely relieve 
the judicial sector, while six others do not see any positive relationship between vetting 
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 Regardless of the fact that Kosovo is dealing with a new system of verification, this paper 
discloses that the system is greatly challenged due to political implications and the clannish 
and/or individual decisions to issue or deny the security clearance for police body, intelligence 
personnel and civil servants. As such, the system needs improvements in the following areas: 
Short Term Goals: 
 Strengthen the Parliamentary Oversight 
Transparency and accountability are the fundamentals of a democratic government, as such, the 
primary responsibility falls completely on the shoulders of parliament. Considering that the 
system of security vetting in Kosovo lacks adequate parliamentary oversight, the measurements 
to be taken towards improving the current condition must start with the strengthening of the 
parliamentary oversight.  
 Ensure a system of checks and balances between the security institutions 
To prevent the concentration of authorization within one security entity, there should be check 
and balances between all the security institutions in Kosovo. The concentration of power and 
authority in the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (an institution horizontally equal with the other 
security institutions) has become one of the main topic discussions in the security sector. KIA’s 
responsibility as an executive body makes it a “super-institution”, disfavoring furthermore the 
other security institution and hindering the vetting process. To avoid this from happening, a new 
system of checks and balances must be introduced so that all the security institutions have the 
same authority over one another. 
 Restructure the appealing system 
As highlighted in this research study, one of the drawbacks of the current system of security 
clearances is the appealing system. Not only is there a backload of cases of people who have 
been denied their security clearance certificates, but there are many more who have appealed to 
the agency’s decision regarding the denial of their certificates. As pinpointed in the literature 
review section, one of the major debates between two security institutions namely KIA and KP, 
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has revolved around the denial of security clearances of numerous police officers. The appealing 
system for the cases of the Police personnel was not in accordance with the Law on Classified 
Information and Security Clearances but rather served the interest of the KIA. As appealing 
system is crucial to establishing a reliable and accountable security vetting system, restructuring 
it is a necessity.  
 Awareness raising on the importance of vetting 
As it was continually stated throughout this project, conducting research on the field of security 
vetting was a difficult challenge mainly due to the nature of the topic and the unfamiliarity of 
citizens with the topic. Had the population been more aware of the activities of the Intelligence 
Agency and the vetting system as a whole, the surveys could disclose much more accurate data 
and therefore provide much helpful insights into the topic of security clearances. Educating civil 
society, public officials and other staff about the purpose and benefits of vetting would ensure a 
more trustworthy process. 
Along with the goals that can be achieved in the short term, institutions should also address long 
term goals as listed below: 
Long Term Goals: 
 Restructure of personnel 
 Independent Expertise 
 Reduce political and personal influence 
 International Cooperation 
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 The aim of this Honors Project was to provide insights into the current condition of 
Kosovo’s vetting system, highlight its drawbacks, and provide recommendations on how to 
overcome them. The results of primary and secondary data confirmed that while security vetting 
system in Kosovo has been recently established, it remains greatly challenged by political 
implications and the clannish and/or individual decisions to issue or to deny security clearance 
certificates. This study reveals that Kosovo’s current system of security vetting requires 
immediate reform in several aspects. 
 The literature review section of this project provided a comprehensive view on the topic 
by explaining in detail the current vetting system in Kosovo, the process of security clearances, 
as well as the agency who exercises vetting authority. Next, two main laws regulating the vetting 
system in Kosovo: Law No. 03/L-178 2010 on the Classification of Information and Security 
Clearances and Law No. 03/L-063 2008 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency provided the 
framework for analyzing current condition and potential challenges of the system. Next, three 
problems with regards to supervision of legality were identified. And finally, the literature 
review presented the Draft Law on Protection of Classified Information according to which the 
new intelligence agency is to be established. This section provided necessary information to help 
the readers understand the obstacles that the verification of security system is facing. 
 The analysis of the secondary data suggested that (1) Citizens’ trust towards the Kosovo 
Intelligence Agency has been decreasing over years; (2) There is an immediate need for reform 
on the vetting process in Kosovo; (3) A law amendment could improve the oversight of the 
security sector as well as foster democratic governance, and (4) A new legal framework would 
remove the conflict of interest between the intelligence agency and parliamentary committee. 
 Findings from the semi-structured in-depth interviews held with 12 different participants 
were grouped into four main categories: institutional, political, legal, and procedural flaws. 
Whereas, findings of the quantitative part of this research project, namely surveys conducted 
with 37 individuals from different profiles relevant to the topic were grouped into five 
categories: (1) Demographics, (2) Respondents’ opinion regarding the effectiveness of security 
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vetting in Kosovo, (3) Respondents’ opinion regarding the role of the intelligent service, (4) 
Respondents’ opinion regarding security clearances, and (5) Respondents’ opinion regarding the 
Draft Law on Protection of the classified information and the Agency for Protection of Classified 
Information (APCI). Interview and survey results came up with a helpful conclusion which 
suggests that the current vetting system in Kosovo is characterized with poor law 
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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MONITORING THE 
DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONING OF INTELLIGENT 
SERVICES IS VERY IMPORTANT
Fully agree Agree No opinion Don’t agree Totally disagree
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KOSOVO'S LEGAL BASIS IS IN HARMONIZATION WITH 
LEGISLATION OF THE EU REQUIRED FOR WELL-
FUNCTIONING OF SECURITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.




KIA’S ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE LAW NO.03/L –178 ON CLASSIFICATION OF 
INFORMATION AND SECURITY CLEARANCES
Yes No Only partly
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HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ISSUED OR DENIED A SECURITY 
CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE?
I have been issued the security clearance certificate
I have been denied the security clearance certificate
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B. Consent Form 
Informed Consent Form for Social Science Research  
RIT Kosovo 
Title of Project:  
Principal Investigator:   Rita Ejupi, RIT Kosovo student 
   21, Sejdi Kryeziu, Prishtine 
    045-344-001; ritae@auk.org 
 
1.  Purpose of the Study:  The purpose of this research study is to explore the challenges and 
opportunities of the security vetting system in Kosovo. 
  
2.  Procedures to be followed:  You will be asked to answer 11 questions during this interview.  
  
3.  Duration:  It will take about 25 minutes to complete the interview.  
  
4. Statement of Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is confidential. The data will be 
used only for qualitative insights into the usage of social media marketing among Kosovar businesses.  
  
5.  Voluntary Participation: Your decision to be in this research is voluntary. You can stop at any 
time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer.  
  
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  If you agree to take part in this 
research study and the information outlined above, please sign your name and indicate the date below.    
 
 
You will be given a copy of this form for your records. 
______________________________________________ _____________________ 
Participant Signature Date 
______________________________________________ _____________________ 
Person Obtaining Consent Date 
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C. Interview Questions 
 
1. In what ways do you believe that effective vetting can have positive effects in state building 
processes? 
 
2. Do you believe that our institutions are aware of the vetting system and its law in Kosovo? 
 
3. Do you believe that efficient vetting system can relieve the judicial sector? If yes, in what sense? 
 
4. Do you believe that KP and KSF contribute to jeopardizing the vetting system considering that these 
institutions don’t have good relations with one another? 
 
5. Do you view KIA’s secretiveness as an obstacle for effective public oversight? 
 
6. What is your opinion regarding the appealing system? 
 
7. Do you see legal inconsistencies that lead to oversight obstacles? 
 
8. At which point of the current vetting system do you see the greatest reform need? 
 
9. Do you believe that KIA should no longer have vetting authority? 
 
10. Do you believe that the new body should be incorporated into another body e.g. the Prime Minister’s 
office or that it should be administratively and politically independent? 
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D. Survey Questions 
 




d) Above 61 
 
2. What is your gender? 
a) Male 
b) Female  
 
3. What is your highest level of education? 
a) Primary Education 





4. What is your profession? 
Please enter your answer  
 
5. Kosovo’s legal basis is in harmonization with  legislation of the European Union required for 
the functioning of security policies and practices of intelligence services 
a) I fully agree 
b) I agree 
c) I don’t have an opinion 
d) I disagree 
e) I strongly disagree 
 
6. Do you agree with the following statement: “Kosovo has an effective security vetting 
system”. 
a) I fully agree 
b) I agree 
c) I don’t have an opinion 
d) I don’t agree 
e) I strongly disagree 
 
7. The former role of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency served the interest of political groups 
a) I fully agree 
b) I agree 
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c) I don’t have an opinion 
d) I don’t agree 
e) I strongly disagree 
 
8. Today, the scope of intelligent service in Kosovo is based solely on the law 
f) I fully agree 
g) I agree 
h) I don’t have an opinion 
i) I don’t agree 
j) I strongly disagree 
 
9. The role of Civil Society in monitoring the democratic functioning of Intelligent Services is 
very important 
a) I fully agree 
b) I agree 
c) I don’t have an opinion 
d) I don’t agree 
e) I strongly disagree 
 
10. What makes a successful and a trustworthy Intelligence Service in a democratic country? 
 
a) Intelligent Service Methodology 
b) Democratic Control 
c) Technical and Technological Equipment 
d) Geopolitical Interests 
e) Financial Aspects 
f) Strategic Orientation of National Security Policies 
g) International Cooperation 
 








13. Have you ever been issued or denied a security clearance? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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If yes, from 1 to 5 how satisfied are you with the vetting procedure conducted by the Kosovo Intelligence 
Agency? 






14. Do you believe that KIA’s activities have been in accordance with the Law No.03/L –178 on 
Classification of Information and Security Clearances? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Only partly 
 
15. Are you aware of the Draft Law on Protection of the Classified Information? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) I have heard of it but I am not familiar 
 
16. According to the Draft law on Protection of the Classified Information, the security vetting 
authority shall pass from Kosovo Intelligence Agency to the newly established Agency for 
Protection of Classified Information. The process will: (Question with more than one answer) 
a) Improve the oversight of the security sector  
b) Foster the democratic governance 
c) Remove the conflict of interest between the intelligence agency and the parliamentary 
oversight committee 
d) Increase transparency of the vetting process 
e) All of the above 
17.  The establishment of the Agency for Protection of Classified Information (APCI): 
a) Will positively affect the security vetting system 
b) Wil not affect the existing security vetting system 
c) Will negatively affect the security vetting system 
d)  I have no opinion on this matter 
 
 
 
